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 Parmenides on Possibility
 and Thought
 Owen Goldin
 Given the evidence and the nature of Parmenides' writing, it seems that
 Mourelatos (1979, 5) is right in his suggestion that it is time for a 'tolerant
 pluralism' in Parmenidean scholarship. But if a definitive interpretation
 is beyond our reach, we may yet make progress in understanding what
 is to be gained or lost in the depth, cogency, and clarity of our interpre-
 tation of the whole poem when we interpret a line or an argument in one
 manner rather than another.
 For this reason, I do not here defend a complete interpretation of what
 remains of Parmenides' poem. In most important respects I pursue the
 interpretive path taken by G.E.L. Owen (1987a) in his highly influential
 interpretation of the poem. But I take issue with Owen's claim that
 Parmenides' argument for the existence of any object of reference or
 thought rests on fallacious modal logic. I also take issue with the view
 of Tugwell (1964) that Parmenides' argument rests on a naive and
 philosophically unsatisfactory blurring of the distinction between the
 potential and existential uses of eivou. I suggest that Parmenides' argu-
 ment for the being of the object of thought and speech takes a different
 course. On my view, Parmenides explicitly denies that there are unreal
 but possible things or states of affairs, on the grounds that possible
 beings can be understood only as beings and hence as real. Since any
 object of thought or speech is a possible thing or state of affairs, any
 object of thought or speech is. On my view, Parmenides thus draws
 attention to what has come to be a perennial metaphysical problem:
 what status is to be given to possible beings?
 I begin by sketching a key part of Owen's interpretation of Par-
 menides' poem. Parmenides wishes to indicate what can be said of any
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 20 Owen Goldin
 object of thought or speech; the attributes and identity of such a thing
 are meant to become clear in the inexorable course of the poem's
 deductions (Owen 1987a, 14-16). In fr. 2, Parmenides indicates two paths
 for thought, one to be taken, one to be avoided at all costs. The first is
 'that it exists and that it is not possible for it not to exist' (i.e., that it
 necessarily exists), the second that 'it does not exist and it necessarily
 does not exist.'1 These paths, which present the directions in which
 thought can proceed, are taken to be expressed as propositions, premises
 from which there are to be deduced further propositions, for example,
 that it is one and that it neither comes to be nor passes away (Owen
 1987al3-14, 1987b, 33). But these premises are themselves not axiomatic.
 Nor are they implicitly supported on Meinongian grounds (that is, on
 the basis of the argument that an object of thought must be, at least qua
 object of thought).2 Rather there is an explicit argument for these prem-
 ises within two of the extant fragments. These are fr. 3: tò yàp amò voeîv
 èoiív xe Kai eivai ('the same thing is for thought and for being') and fr.
 6.1-2: xpTl to Xéyeiv xe voeîv x' éòv elevai / ëaxi yàp eîvai, |xr|5èv ô' oùk
 ëaxiv ('what can be spoken and thought of must exist; for it can exist,
 whereas nothing cannot'), following which the presence of an argument
 is signaled by the imperative 'think that out' (fr. 6.2) (Owen 1987a, 15).
 1 The interpretation of Owen, as well as that of Barnes, rests on taking certain
 occurrences of eîvcci to have the verb's existential sense. Furth (1968) has argued
 that within Parmenides' poem, eîvai has a 'fused' sense, according to which the verb
 simultaneously has what we distinguish as its existential, predicative, and veridical
 senses. Furth's strategy in his paper is to show how the semantic complexity of Eivai
 allows us to understand Parmenides as presenting concurrent arguments concern-
 ing what exists, what is something or other, and what is true. I concur. The
 interpretation I here propose can hold if the relevant occurrences of eîvai are given
 existential, predicative, or veridical senses. (However, those instances of eîvai I
 understand as 'potential-existential,' namely the eioi at fr. 2, 2, the eon at fr. 2, 3, the
 éon at fr. 2, 5, the êaxív in fr. 3, the éòv and &m at fr. 6, 1, cannot involve the
 predicative or veridical senses in a way consistent with my understanding of their
 grammatical roles.) See notes 7, 11, and 17. But for the sake of simplicity, within the
 main text I take Owen's interpretation as a point of departure and take eîvai, in the
 occurrences in question, to have its existential sense.
 2 Such an interpretation is presented by Hussey (1972, 85-6). On this interpretation,
 Parmenides is taken to be making the kind of Meinongian inference that we find at
 Republic V 478B-C: what is an object of thought must be, insofar as it is an object of
 thought.
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 The argument, as reconstructed by Owen (1987a, 15-16) and followed in
 its essentials by Barnes (1982, 164-7, 174-5)3 is as follows. What can be
 thought can be, and what can be can be thought. But what is not cannot
 be. Since it is not the case that what is not can be, it is not the case that
 what is not can be thought. Hence if something is an object of thought,
 it cannot be what is not; by logical necessity4 it is what is. This logical
 necessity is reflected in fr. 2.3: ot>K eon 'ir' eivoci.
 On this interpretation, Parmenides asserts that what is not cannot be
 as a conclusion in fr. 2.5 (xpecov ëoxi 'n' eîvoci) and as a premise in fr. 6.2
 (nr|5èv ô' OÙK eaxiv <eîvai>). According to Owen and Barnes, Parmenides
 has no warrant in taking the necessity here as de re; on what grounds
 could Parmenides take all cases of nonbeing to be necessary de rei To say
 this would be to glibly assert that possible being and actual being are
 coextensive. This runs counter to both language and metaphysical intui-
 tion. We often conceive and talk about nonbeings that might have been.
 Parmenides is justified in saying only that, from the fact that something
 is not, it follows as a matter of logical necessity that it is not.5 But the
 conclusion 'what is not cannot be an object of thought' follows only if
 'what is not cannot be' is taken to assert that, for any nonbeing, the fact
 that it is not is necessary de re, that is, its nonbeing is a necessary feature
 of reality.6 So Parmenides' argument rests on the confusion between
 necessitas consequentis and necessitas consequentiae (Owen 1987a, 15n47,
 Barnes 1982, 164).
 One may on philosophical grounds challenge whether we are justi-
 fied in imputing to Parmenides the fallacious argument outlined above.
 Further, there is a philological challenge to the Diels-Kranz reading of
 fr. 6, 1, on which the Owen/Barnes interpretation rests. I first indicate
 3 On this see also Anscombe (1968/9, 125-6).
 4 I follow Sorabji (1980, 206) in my use of 'logical necessity' here: 'We take a logically
 necessary truth as one which is forced on us by the meanings of the logical particles
 alone ('not', 'if', 'then', 'and', etc.)' Logical necessity so understood is a kind of de
 dicto necessity. The logical necessity of fr. 2.3 is that of the conditional.
 5 This is symbolized: D(~p- >~p), where p is an assertion of being, in whatever sense
 we take to be Parmenides' concern. This would then make a statement of de dicto
 or logical necessity.
 6 This is symbolized: ~p->D~p. Here we make a statement of de re or metaphysical
 necessity.
This content downloaded from 134.48.158.106 on Thu, 14 Dec 2017 15:33:00 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 22 Owen Goldin
 the objections, and then suggest a line of interpretation that maintains
 the general drift of Owen's understanding of the poem, meets both the
 philosophical and philological objections, and has Parmenides making
 a philosophically significant point concerning the metaphysics of possi-
 ble being.
 I begin with the philosophical objection. In response to Owen's analy-
 sis, Tugwell has written that Parmenides has erred in holding that
 if a thing is thinkable it must exist. This is not a mere petitio principii; it
 arises in part from the ambiguous nature of the word eivai. If you can
 think of a thing, it follows that you can say of it eaxi voeiv (I leave the
 words unaccented intentionally). It is unfair to translate this, "it is
 possible for it to be thought about." This separates off the potential
 eivai from the existential to an anachronistic extent ... I should prefer
 to translate eon voeîv in B 3 and B 6 as "it is there for thought." But how
 can it be there for thought if it is not there? (1964, 36-7)
 Tugwell suggests that eîvoci is ambiguous, and Parmenides simply
 did not have a sufficient semantic analysis of the term to allow him to
 avoid confusion in his argument. On this reading, Parmenides would
 reason for the necessary being of any object of reference or thought as
 follows. What can be referred to or thought about can be (eon eivou,
 where eaxi has its potential sense and eivou has its existential sense).
 Parmenides then slides to an understanding of ëoti eîvcci as 'exists for
 being', where both verbs have the existential sense, and the second is an
 example of the dative or explicative infinitive. This yields the conclusion
 that necessarily, what can be referred to or thought exists.7 It follows that
 what does not exist can neither be referred to nor be thought.8
 7 Following Furth's lead, the eivai here (but not the eaxi) could also be given a
 predicative or veridical sense. On this account, Parmenides slides from under-
 standing ëoxi eîvai as 'can be x' or 'can be true' to 'exists for beings x' or 'exists for
 being true.' It follows that what can be x, or what can be true, already exists.
 8 Tugwell may not be entirely consistent in his account of Parmenides' argument. He
 translates 6.1 as 'what exists to be referred to or thought about, must exist; for it is
 there to exist' but paraphrases this as 'if you are thinking about something ... if it is
 nothing, it cannot (presumably logical necessity here) be something, and so it cannot
 be what you were thinking about' (1964, 2). Here Parmenides is not taken to be
 discussing what can be thought about (which is what is required for determining
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 On this interpretation, then, Parmenides' fallacy is taken to lie not in
 the misplacement of modal qualifiers but in his ignorance of how his
 language is equivocal.
 Kahn's ground breaking studies on eivai (1966, 1973) provide partial
 confirmation of Tugwell's remarks. Kahn showed that eîvai as a verb of
 occurrence, in which an abstract verbal noun is the subject of eîvai, is
 developed from the locative sense of eîvai, in which it is said that there
 is something of a certain kind at some place.9 When the infinitive is
 employed instead of the verbal noun, the infinitive denotes an action not
 'as fact but as a goal ot project to be carried out.' In "Hpr|, Keiae nèv eaxi
 Kai tíaxepov ópfrn&íivai (II 14.313), hastening is posited as something
 available as intention or goal. This is the root sense of the potential use
 of eivai, in which it 'functions as a (modal) sentence operator on the
 underlying sentence represented by the infinitival clause' (1973, 295-6,
 cf. 1968/9, 709-10n.l2).
 Kahn's more detailed analysis shows that Tugwell was right in deny-
 ing that the ancient Greek mind would have discerned a sharp distinc-
 tion between the potential and existential (or locative) uses of eivou. Since
 Owen's analysis rested on there being a firm distinction between these
 two senses, it needs to be amended in light of these results.
 There is another respect in which recent research has shown that
 Owen's analysis needs to be amended . As we have seen, Owen accepts the
 DK reading of fr. 6.1-2: xpti tò Aiyew xe voeîv x' éòv elevai / eau yàp eîvai,
 Hî|8èv 8' oil)k ëaxiv, and translates 'what can be spoken and thought of must
 exist, for it can exist, whereas nothing cannot. As so rendered, fr. 6.1
 provides the theoretical justification for taking the first path of inquiry
 and for shunning the second, while fr. 6.2, along with fr. 3, provides the
 argument for this. Since it was first proposed by Burnet (1930, 174), the
 viability of this reading of the Greek has been the object of a long and
 sustained controversy (see e.g. Kahn 1968/9, 722n26). But the point is now
 moot, since Cordero has reported the results of Taran's examination of the
 manuscripts: Diels erred in indicating xe instead of xò as the manuscript
 the path for inquiry) but is taken to be discussing what is thought at a given time.
 So Tugwell at this point interprets Parmenides to be arguing along Meinongian
 lines.
 9 An example Kahn presents is Od 11.605: (jtm>i ôé p-iv KXayyri veicúcov f¡v oicovôv cpç.
 Here an action, considered as actual, is said to be occurring at a place (1973, 283).
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 reading (Cordero 1979, 24-25nl; 1987, 19-20). So while Owen took the
 clause Aiyeiv ie voeîv xe to contain a pair of infinitives each of which is a
 complement of the participial form of the potential eivai (xò ... éòv), we
 now see that the first xe must be read as a to. How are we to construe this
 second tò, and still preserve the sense advocated by Owen? It cannot
 modify èòv; that is the task of the first tó. Nor can it modify either infinitive,
 since the potential usage of eivou (some form of eîvai + the infinitive),
 which must be seen to be employed here if the clause is to have the sense
 advocated by Owen, does without the definite article. So a crucial prop of
 Owen's interpretation of the argument is removed.
 Let us see if we can reconstruct Parmenides' argument, with the above
 points in mind. We begin with fr. 3: tò yàp amò voeîv éoTÍv te Kai eivai.10
 If the eon in both ëaxi voeîv and ëoTiv eîvai is potential-existential, we
 must understand Parmenides as saying that it is the same thing whose
 being11 is present as a project, goal, or intended activity and of which the
 cognition is likewise present (at least) as a project, goal or intended
 activity. If a goal or plan is available for action, it is at least available for
 cognition, and vice versa.
 This analysis has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage
 is that it allows us to interpret fr. 3 as providing the premise 'that which
 can be thought can be' . Another advantage is that it does not rest on taking
 voeîv and eîvai as dative infinitives, the existence of which is controver-
 sial.12 One disadvantage is that, just as if voeîv and eîvai were taken as
 10 Kahn himself (1968/9, 721) translates fr. 3 as 'for knowing and thinking are the
 same/ departing from most English language commentators since Burnet. He
 likewise gives 6.1-2 a (nowadays) unorthodox rendering according to which it too
 affirms an identity between being and thought: 'Cognition and statement must be
 what-is (i.e., must be true and real)' (1968/9, 722). He does not, however, show how,
 on this interpretation, these lines would not be out of place within the context of the
 rest of fr. 6. Though I am here using Kahn's analysis of eîvai to shed light on
 fragments 3 and 6, my understanding of these fragments is very different from that
 of Kahn.
 11 'Being' here can be taken as existential, or in the 'fused' sense proposed by Furth,
 on which seen. 1.
 12 See Kahn (1973, 179nlO8). In spite of Kahn's objections, it is still the common practice
 to render these and other infinitives in the poem as dative infinitives. Indeed Kahn
 himself interprets vocerai at fr. 2.2 as 'loosely epexegetical' though he parts from
 most scholars in taking it to be a complement of óôoí (1968/9, 703n4). It is hard to
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 merely potential (with no connotation of the existential usage), tò amó
 functions as both the object of voeîv and the subject of eivou. Though this
 reading is somewhat awkward, this is not a decisive objection, since there
 are examples of similar constructions employed by other writers.13 A
 second disadvantage is that, in order to yield the desired premise, that
 what is capable of being thought is capable of existing, that which eon
 eîvoti cannot be restricted to those activities or entities which are the
 objects of intention or purpose. To this two responses can be made. First,
 Aristotle, whose metaphysics of nature was intended to support and
 render intelligible an everyday understanding of the world, held that
 realizations of possibilities were attainments of goals, even if these reali-
 zations were not goals held by conscious agents. It may not have been so
 alien to the Greek mind to take every case of possible being as having the
 status of something aimed at or intended. Second, Kahn's analysis is
 intended to elucidate 'the uses of the verb before it became a topic for
 philosophical discussion' and 'the ontological predispositions of the
 Greek language, and not with the philosophic doctrines that exploit these
 linguistic possibilities' (1973, 9). Parmenides may well have been on the
 way to a technical refinement of the potential eîvoci; perhaps for him it no
 longer denotes having some location in its availability for human action.
 The important point is that it still maintains the sense of having a location
 understand this 'epexegetical' infinitive in a way other than as functioning as a
 dative, even if it is here a dative complement of a noun and not a verb. It would
 have been more consistent for Kahn to have taken eiai vofiaoci at fr. 2.2 as 'it is
 possible to think/ explicated in accordance with his understanding of the potential
 eivai. The objection Kahn raises, that for Parmenides the second way cannot be
 thought, is answered by Furth (1968, 131-32): 'Parmenides' basic procedure is
 elenctic/ But it should be noted that my remarks on the metaphysical import of frs.
 3 and 6 would hold even if the 'eivai + the infinitive of x' construction in these
 fragments were to be taken as 'is for x-ing/ with the infinitive playing the role of a
 dative (thereby avoiding the second of the two disadvantages of my proposed
 interpretation that I have indicated below). For the subject of eivai would be already
 posited as something that is.
 13 For the objection see Mansfeld (1964, 63-4). For a response, see O'Brien (1987, 20),
 who gives the following examples: Homer, Iliad, IX 230-31 (év Ôoip ôè [se. éaxí]
 aaoxrénev r' àrcoAiaOai / vtiaç èx>oaek'ioxx;), Aristotle, Physics III 2, 202a2-3 (xa^eirìiv
 ¿lèv iôeîv, èvôexo^évTiv Ô' eîvai), and, notably, Physics Vili 1, 251bl9-20 (ei ovv
 àôvvccTÓv éaxiv Kai eivai Kal vofjoai xpóvov ôtvei) xov vûv . . .). For another response,
 see Furley (1969, Iln35).
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 through some kind of availability. Inasmuch as it has such a location, that
 which is denoted by the infinitive in the eîvoci + infinitive construction in
 some sense already is.14
 So we follow Owen in interpreting fr. 3 as affirming that possible
 objects of thought and possible beings are coextensive. We differ in
 seeing that, in employing the potential eivai, Parmenides already signals
 that what is possible has the status of presence as available.
 Let us consider the status of Parmenides' argument once fr . 3 has been
 posited. If we take it as an initial assumption that there are three classes15
 a) what is, b) what can be but is not, and c) what cannot be and
 (consequently) is not, fr. 3 yields the result that only members of classes
 a and b are possible objects of thought. But the conclusion of fr. 2 is not
 that thought (and consequently speech) are to be restricted to possible
 beings, but that they are to be restricted to what (really) is (class a). So it
 must be shown that class b is empty. I suggest that fr. 6, 1-2 (on the
 reading of the manuscript), the context of which is unknown, provides
 an argument for precisely this conclusion: that everything that can be is.
 The fact that some things are unreal yet possible is an obvious objection
 to Parmenides, and one that clearly does not depend on the formulation
 of later philosophical innovations.16 It would have been strange for Par-
 14 Cf. Kahn (1966, 258): 'We have from Presocratic times the well-established axiom
 that whatever is, is somewhere; what is nowhere is nothing.'
 15 I use the term 'class' here in a loose sense, as signifying kinds conceivable in this
 dialectical context.
 16 So, in the context of an evaluation of Parmenides' argument as he conceives of it,
 Barnes (1982, 167) raises the objection 'Not all nonentities are impossibilia: many
 things might, but do not exist,' and calls the flaw in the argument 'obvious and ...
 offensive.' Owen (1987a, Iln34) takes Parmenides to implicitly acknowledge the
 objection insofar as Parmenides grants the possibility of a third way of inquiry,
 which is attained through negating both of the first two ways, so that the object of
 the third way of inquiry is such that it is possible to be and it is possible not to be
 (fr. 6, 8-9; fr. 7, 1-2). Against this interpretation O'Brien has forcefully argued at
 length that Parmenides never relaxes a strict logical distinction between being and
 nonbeing, so that the two are mutually exclusive (1987, 187-226). O'Brien suggests
 that Owen erred in anachronistically importing into his interpretation of Par-
 menides the Aristotelian laws concerning the contradictories of modal propositions
 (1987, 192-6). He argues that Parmenides must be committed to a logical scheme
 according to which a proposition is necessary if and only if it is possible (1987,
 288-94). O'Brien rightly sees that Parmenides is ultimately committed to identifying
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 menides not to have addressed this possibility. Let us imagine the goddess
 arguing from the principle that what is thinkable is a possible being17 to
 the conclusion that what is thinkable is a being. In this context we read fr.
 6.1-2 (following the manuscript for 6.1), which I translate: 'it is necessary
 to say and to think what is for being, for it is for being, but it is not nothing. 18
 I command you to ponder these things/ This canbe interpreted as follows.
 Anytime you say that something ecm eivou, you are already committed to
 its being real. The being of the thing already is in the availability of that
 being.19 So the thing itself already is.20 You are not speaking of |HTiôév; your
 speech is not without object. It is perhaps in regard in such items that, in
 fr. 4, 1 Parmenides declares 'see those things, though they are away from
 you, that are firmly beside your mind' (Xevgge ô' ojucoç arceóvioc vóco
 possible and necessary being. I differ in proposing that fr. 6 can be read as an
 argument for the thesis that every possible being is a being, and that the identification
 of every being as a necessary being follows from the thesis of the homogeneity of
 being posited at fr. 8, 22-5. If we are to follow O'Brien in denying that such an
 argument is present, we must either consider Parmenides a shoddy thinker or
 follow O'Brien in considering the Aristotelian conception of possibility as wholly
 inapplicable to everyday pre-Aristotelian discourse. Both options ought to be
 avoided if possible.
 17 'Being' here can be interpreted as either 'existent,' 'predicate,' or 'fact.' See n. 1.
 18 Taking jatiÔév as predicate complement is possible only if we read oük éaxiv for o')k
 ëaxiv. If we keep the usual reading, fr. 6.1-2 can still be read as presenting the same
 argument. For in that case we can render the first half of fr. 6.2 as 'it is not possible
 for nothing to be', understood as 'the being of nothing has no status of availability
 at all.' Cf. O'Brien (1987, 27, 214nl9). It would follow that the notion of a possible
 that is yet unreal (i.e. nothing) is incoherent; insofar as a possible entity has the status
 of being available for being, it is not nothing.
 19 Robinson (1975, 627) likewise takes éóv to have a '"locative" or "availability" use'
 here. For an alternative account, see n. 10.
 20 Robinson (1975, 627-8) similarly translates the second half of 6.1 'for it is there to be
 real,' though he understands the argument of 6.1-2 very differently, resting on the
 (to my mind unjustified) assumption that what is real is either what is available for
 ^éyeiv and voeîv or is nothing at all. Cf. also Gallop (1979, 69 and 1984, 31nl6) who
 interprets 6.1 as to the effect that 'what is there to speak and think of is there to exist.'
 Gallop recognizes the philosophical importance of the locative overtones of the
 existential ëaxi. I differ from Gallop insofar as, following Kahn, I take it to be the
 infinitive which functions as the subject of the locative /potential eon. On this see
 Cordero (1979, 3-4) and Stokes (1971, 306n44).
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 TtotpeóvToc ßeßccicoc) . A being that is merely a possible being still has a being
 which, though in some sense apart from (arcó) us, still is, and it is through
 our minds that we are aware of this.21
 Tugwell was right in denying a sharp distinction for Parmenides
 between the potential eîvcci on the one hand, and the existential (or
 veridical or copulative) eîvoti on the other. But this is not a cause of
 conceptual confusion, leading to a bad argument.22 Instead, we see that
 Parmenides has explicitly considered the status of a possible existent; its
 being is, as an availability, intention or goal. Though Parmenides' think-
 ing is led by the linguistic idiom in which he works, his thought is not
 bound to it. Parmenides recognizes that any status given to a possible
 entity grants to it some kind of being. At this stage in the argument, that
 is all he needs to secure the conclusion that any possible object of thought
 or reference already is. He has not yet argued that there cannot be
 different modes of being. That must wait until fr. 8, 12-5,23 in which, on
 the prevailing interpretation, Parmenides affirms the homogeneity and
 continuity of being. Those who, like myself, accept the traditional inter-
 pretation of Parmenides as a monist, find the argument for the unity of
 being within these lines.24
 Whatever we think of this argument for monism (if indeed it is
 Parmenides' argument) need not color our evaluation of the argument
 for the existence of possible beings that we are presently considering.
 This argument is that, as soon as we take possibilities to be real features
 of the world, some ontological status must be granted to a possible being.
 At this point it would be useful to contrast the argument for the being
 of the object of thought and speech that I am attributing to Parmenides
 with the Meinongian argument for the being of unreal objects.25 On
 21 Cf. Furley (1973, 11): 'Under this description <xò Aiyeiv xe voeìv x' éov> Parmenides
 says that it must be, because it can be/
 22 Stokes (1971, 306n44) rightly indicates that the stark contrast between xpecov i>axi 'n'
 Eivai (fr. 2.5) and o'>k eoxi 'ir' eîvcti (fr. 2.3) shows that Tarmenides could distinguish
 in use, if not in the abstract' between the potential and existential uses of eivai.
 23 Furth (1968, 121) sees the argument against merely possible objects as implicit in fr.
 8.11: oi)xcoç r' ná'inav neXévai xpeœv èoxiv r' o'>xi- See also Gallop (1979, 68).
 24 See e.g. Owen (1987a, 12-13), Hussey (1972, 92-3); against this see Mourelatos (1970,
 111-14), Barnes (1979, 7-12) and Curd (1991, 256-7).
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 Meinong's account, we must ascribe being (sein) to a square circle or a
 mountain of gold, for they already have the ontological status of being
 objects of thought, even though they are not real (wirklich). For to be an
 object of thought is to already have the status of being an object. Such a
 status is to be granted to that for which it is impossible to be real, as well
 as to that whose reality is possible, but absent (Meinong 1960, 76-86). On
 this account, it is the thinkability of a thing which directly grants to it its
 being. Parmenides' argument differs in two important respects. First, in
 fr . 3 Parmenides takes it as axiomatic that only what is possibly real can be
 an object of thought. So he would on the face of it deny that a square circle
 is thinkable. Second, he takes the fact that we can think of a thing to be
 evidence for its having the status of being possibly real. He then argues
 that a possible reality must already in some sense be. This is an immediate
 consequence of its possibility, not of its thinkability, as for Meinong.
 There is a long and distinguished history to the argument that a
 possible being must already be by virtue of its possibility. I indicate only
 three examples, one drawn from ancient philosophy (Aristotle), and two
 from contemporary analytic metaphysics (Quine and Lewis), in order to
 indicate the importance of the insight I attribute to Parmenides and how
 it has been employed for very different ends.
 For Aristotle as well as Parmenides, a potential being is a being, albeit
 a being of kind very different from that of an actual being. Aristotle was
 led to posit potentiality as a kind of being for fundamentally Parmenidean
 reasons. On several occasions, Aristotle addresses the Parmenidean chal-
 lenge to the possibility of change: how can what is come from what is not?
 (fr. 8, 9-10) He never responds by denying that it is impossible for what is
 to come to be from what is not at all (ocrcÀxoç); rather the problem is to be
 solved by distinguishing different modes of being and nonbeing. Par-
 menides is said to have erred in not having distinguished between poten-
 tial and actual being; an attribute, activity, or substance must already
 potentially be in the persistent substrate from which it comes to be (Phys
 1 8, 191b28-9, GC 1 3, 317a32-b33, cf. MetaphG 3, 1046b29-1047a29.) We see
 that from an Aristotelian point of view, there is nothing amiss in the
 inference of fr. 6 that something such that it eon eîvoti must be such that it
 ecm. Aristotle rather takes Parmenides to have gone amiss at fr. 8, 22-5,
 where it is argued that all being is homogeneous.
 25 See n. 2, above.
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 Aristotle has no qualms in positing an infinite and in principle unspe-
 cif iable set of possibilities that are ontologically grounded as inherent in
 actual substances. (Indeed, potential beings alone are the sort of being of
 which there can be an indefinite quantity. This is a consequence of Aris-
 totle's view that quantitative infinity is entailed by the possibility of always
 making one more division of a magnitude, and hence exists only in
 potentiality; Phys III 7, 207bl-15.) These are things or features of reality
 that are, in potentiality. A potentiality will not be able to do its work for
 Aristotle unless it is a potential being, where this means not simply a
 potentiality for being, but something that already is a being, in the manner
 of a potentiality. Thus at Metaph A 7, 1017a35-b9, Aristotle distinguishes
 potentiality and actuality as modes of being: 'Further eivai signifies
 potential being and actual being, in the cases of the things we have
 discussed. For we say that both the one potentially seeing and the once
 actually seeing is seeing' (exi tò ewoci ar||iaivei Kai to ov jièv ôuvá^ei, tò
 S' évTeJlexeía tcov eí prifiévcov toútcov • ópcov te yàp eivai (pa^iev Kai tò ouvirei
 ópcov Kai tò évTeÀ,£%eía [1017a35-b3]). Aristotle makes clear that even if
 something has no actual being, as long as it can have actual being, it can
 already be said to be, for it is in potentiality. This is a metaphysical claim
 about the modes of being, not merely a remark about linguistic usage.
 Aristotle would thus accept the argument of fr. 6, 1-2 of Parmenides'
 poem, as I have reconstructed it, though he would resist the further
 inference that all being, including both possible being and actual being, is
 homogenous.
 Quine also accepts the Parmenidean insight that a possible being is
 already a being.26 On this basis Quine argues that any possible beings to
 which we can refer must be such as can be quantified over and individu-
 ated like any other being. The problems involved in such individuation
 and quantification (Quine 1961, 2-4), which were of no concern to
 Aristotle, lead Quine to hold the view that there are in truth no possible
 entities. If a semantic analysis is to be given of modal propositions, it will
 not be through appeal to possible beings. So Quine is in agreement with
 Parmenides and Aristotle that a possible entity (if there were such a
 thing) would have to be regarded as a being, with a place in one's
 ontology. He also agrees with Aristotle that possible and actual being
 26 The comparison to Quine is made, to another end, by Furth (1968, 119, 121).
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 are not to be identified. But he disagrees with Aristotle insofar as he
 denies that there are, in fact, any merely possible beings.
 Parmenides never clearly specifies exactly what sort of thing counts as
 a being. On the standard reading of the poem (which I accept), by the end
 of his metaphysical deduction, only a single, partless changeless being is
 left as object of reference and thought. Aristotle, who rejects Parmenides'
 metaphysical deduction, takes there to be as many kinds of possible
 beings as there are actual beings. The doctrine of the categories is meant
 to account for the ways in which we say that a thing is, and consequently,
 to account for the ways in which something really is. Quine too takes
 possibilia (if there were such things) to be of the same kinds as the sorts of
 beings referred to in nonmodal discourse; thus his example of the 'possi-
 ble man in the doorway' (1961, 4). Lewis too is concerned with the status
 of possible subjects and predicates of the kind that are the objects of
 nonmodal discourse. But, like many contemporary philosophers, he
 champions possible worlds semantics as providing a means by which one
 can individuate and quantify over these possible entities. The metaphysi-
 cal problem of the ontological status oí possibilia is not thereby solved. But
 in this case the focus is on a certain kind of entity, a world, with its own
 history and inventory of inhabitants. Lewis's argument for 'modal real-
 ism' in regard to possible worlds (and, derivatively, in regard to the
 inhabitants of possible worlds) again follows essentially Parmenidean
 lines: we posit possible worlds as beings (albeit possible beings). Hence
 possible worlds exist just as much as does the world in which we find
 ourselves. As Lewis (1986, 2) writes T do not have the slightest idea what
 a difference in manner of existing is supposed to be.' The only difference
 between the 'actual' world and possible worlds is perspectivai: 'Every
 world is actual at itself, and thereby all worlds are at a par. That is not to say
 that all worlds are actual - there's no world at which that is true' (Lewis,
 1986, 93). When one speaks of the 'actual world' one speaks of that world,
 whichever it is, of which the speaker is an inhabitant.
 So Lewis agrees with Parmenides, Aristotle, and Quine that a possible
 being (if there is such a thing) is a being. He agrees with Aristotle and
 Quine that possible being and actual being are not identical. He agrees
 with Quine that the problems concerning individuation of and quanti-
 fication over possible entities are severe enough to warrant rejection of
 the Aristotelian view that there are an infinite and unspecifiable number
 of potential beings. But, unlike Quine, he believes these problems can be
 solved through possible worlds semantics.
 As in so many other respects, Parmenides is seen to have fixed on a
 crucial metaphysical point to which later thinkers are indebted, whether
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 the debt is recognized or not. Although they differ in the extent to which
 they are willing to grant that difference in the modes or kinds of being
 is intelligible, all four philosophers accept that a thing either is or is not;
 there is no middle ground. Like Parmenides, we can only conceive of a
 possible being as having some kind of status of availability, which
 involves a kind of being, even if this status is not the same as that granted
 to things we call real or actual.
 Let us return to where we began: Parmenides' argument for the thesis
 that only what is can be an object of reference or thought. Parmenides
 asserts without argument that whatever can be thought can be. He
 argues that what is not cannot be, not, as Owen suggests, through a
 misplacement of the modal qualifier27 nor, as Tugwell suggests, through
 being led astray by the fact that eivou is equivocal, but on the basis of a
 reductio ad absurdum argument: If we assume that the nonbeing can
 be, then it already has the status of something whose being is present
 insofar as it is available. As such, it is, which contradicts the premise that
 it is not. Hence no nonbeing can be an object of thought; if something is
 an object of thought, it is a being.
 In this way Parmenides has a respectable argument in support of the
 goddess's admonition to pursue only the first way. Because Parmenides
 has not yet asserted that all being is homogenous, the argument does not
 yet commit Parmenides to the view that there is no distinction between
 possible and actual being (which, if we follow Aristotle (Metaph A 12,
 1019b27-35) in defining the possible as that of which the contradictory is
 not necessary is tantamount to the view that all being is necessary being).
 An objection can be raised: fr. 2, in which Parmenides does present
 his conclusions, does apparently assert that what is necessarily is (oúk
 eon 'ir' eîvoci) and that what is not necessarily is not (xpecov eoxi 'n' eivoci).
 We cannot take this conclusion as dependent on the argument of fr. 8,
 22-5, since the deductions of fr. 8 rest on the necessity to adhere to the
 first way and reject the second way, which is what fr. 2 asserts. Is
 27 Cf. Robinson (1975, 633): "The interpretation of 6.1-2 offered in this paper absolves
 Parmenides of any supposed 'modal fallacy/ since the problems involved in a 'de
 re interpretation of a modal statement' ... are not in fact in question; Parmenides is
 discussing availability, not possibility/ I differ in taking Parmenides to begin by
 discussing possibility, but then to support his argument by giving an account of
 possibility as availability.
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 Parmenides again to be charged with a modal fallacy? Are we to say that
 from 'necessarily, if something eon eivou, eon' Parmenides derives 'if
 something ëon eîvoci, necessarily eon'?
 I think not. Though the thesis of the homogeneity of being does commit
 Parmenides to the identity of being and necessary being, and likewise to
 that of nonbeing and necessary nonbeing, there is no need to take Par-
 menides to be asserting this in fr . 2. The modal qualifiers here could simply
 be taken to indicate logical necessity: if something is it necessarily follows
 that it is; if something is not it necessarily follows that it is not.28 Par-
 menides' argument in support of taking the first way of inquiry and
 rejecting the second, as he expresses it, is neither fallacious nor circular.29
 Unlike Parmenides' first way, the interpretive path I have here indi-
 cated is only one of many. And, while Parmenides takes being to be
 homogeneous, interpretations of a text will not be homogeneous in their
 advantages. While Parmenides' goddess offers strict orders for thought,
 this paper is an invitation to explore only one among many paths for
 thinking about Parmenides' poem.30
 Department of Philosophy
 Coughlin Hall 132
 Marquette University
 Milwaukee, WI 53233
 USA
 28 See Gallop (1979, 78n37).
 29 Still, fr. 5, whatever else it means, apparently indicates that the earlier parts of the
 poem can be read and understood in the light of the later parts. So it is possible that
 fr. 2 is purposefully equivocal. If this is so, fr. 2 does not only assert that the being
 of what is and the nonbeing of what is not are deduced as a matter of logical
 necessity; it also asserts the de re necessity of the being of what is and the nonbeing
 of what is not, which is to be argued for on the basis of fr. 8's thesis of the
 homogeneity of being.
 30 I would like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal, for their valuable
 comments on an earlier draft.
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